Approved For Release 2003/04 : \$44 P 0B01676R001100070010-4

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary, National Security Council

SUBJECT: NSC Action 1355

The Technological Capabilities Panel recommendations, which formed the basis for the subject National Security Council Action, have been reviewed by the Central Intelligence Agency in accordance with the responsibilities assigned in paragraph b. of the subject Action. Those recommendations on which the CIA has sale reporting responsibility are discussed in Tab A. Recommendations on which the CIA has primary reporting responsibility, subject to coordination with other agencies, are discussed in Tab B. Recommendations on which primary responsibility was assigned to other agencies, subject to coordination with the CIA, are discussed in Tab C.

ALLEN W. DULLES

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itichard M. Bissell, ir.
Special Assistant to the Director

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or their own, they will desirthes weigh carefully the considerable cost
in deliars and mappener against the pretability that the CIA will be
able to continue to provide for them a large measure of the services
which they need.

The use of sticentic indexing and sorting equipment and systems such as, for example, vell-known IRR systems should also be noted. The adaptability of these and other systems to meet the expanding needs of the intelligence community is a subject of continuing study.

It is ease to say that both CIA and the Air Force are keeping abreast of all new developments in this field which could be of value to intelligence, and that every avenue which may offer promise of improvement will be employed.

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former containing much hip from and Hovernmental Intelliances agencies further to explore way a many in standards. handling systems



SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATION C 3

1. This recommendation reads as follows:

We must find ways to increase the number of hard facts upon which our intelligence estimates are based, to provide better strategic warning, to minimize surprise in the kind of attack, and to reduce the danger of gross overestimation or gross underestimation of the threat. To this end, we recommend adoption of a vigorous program for the extensive use, in many intelligence procedures, of the most advanced knowledge in science and technology.

2. Discussion:

The CIA agrees with these statements and recommendations. The Director of Central Intelligence has developed plans for implemention in the near future which will make possible a further step toward the achievement of the objective underlying the TCP recommendation, namely: to "use the ultimate in science and technology to improve our intelligence take."

The Agency has created a permanent Scientific Advisory Board, composed largely of former members of the Technological Capabilities Panel, to advise the Director and to supplement existing activities.

The Agency's plans envisage:

- a. The establishment of a suitable unit, with its supporting isboratory facility, to insure the continual creation, recognition and application of new scientific and technical methods for the acquisition, processing, and production of all forms of foreign intelligence.
- b. The establishment of procedures for developing the concomitant equipment and instrumentation peculiar to the production of intelligence, and
- c. The establishment of close working relationships between the unit mentioned in paragraph a. above, and all correlative developmental divisions within the intelligence community and in particular with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (R&D).

-4-



Specific Recommendation A. 9

1. This recommendation reads as follows:

"As a first step in comparing the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the United States and the UNER in a possible maker air var, a comprehensive comparison of U.S. and USSR Brave, Remoo, and Delta target systems be undertaken in the context of a single symmetric study, using common terms of reference and a common framework of analysis."

2. Discussions

The CIA concurs in the statement with respect to this recommendation made by the Department of Defense. Upon the establishment of the requirement and the completion of the terms of reference for such a study, the CIA will support this activity within its present personnel allowances and budget.

1. This recommendation reads as follows:

"See traffic plots should be established utilizing moders techniques for correlating, analyzing, storing and displaying traffic information gathered from both military and civilian sources. Traffic patterns as well as individual abip movements should be carefully watched."

2. Discussions

The CIA communes in the Department of Defence statement on the basis that the plots recommended will provide valuable intelligence on the availability of communist equipment and materials in certain areas for observation or other exploitation.

B 12 c

The successful launching of the first satellite will tedoubledly be an event comparable to the first successful release of nuclear energy to the world's scientific commenty, and will understoodly receive comparable publicity throughout the world. Fublic opinion in both neutral and allied states will be centered on the untellite's development. Or centuries scientists and layers have dressed of exploring outer space. The first successful penetration of space will probably be the small satellite vahicle recessorial penetration of space will probably be the small satellite vahicle recessorial by the feathwisel depublishes rank for mation that first somewhishes this feat will main incoloulable prostion and recognition throughout the world.

Insider of the world has been of immersurable value to competing against device aims in both neutral and allied states. Since the war the reputation of the United States' scientific amments has been charply challenged by devict progress and claims. There is little doubt but that the Seviet Snion would like to surpass our extentific and industrial reputation in order to further has influence over neutralist states and to chake the confidence of states allies with the United States. In the Seviet Union's actentists, technicians and industrialists were apparently to surpass the United States and first explore outer space, her propagants sechion would have sensational and convincing evidence of coviet supprisons.

If the drited states suggestedly launches the first satellite, it is seen important that this be done with unspectionable peaceful intente. The Soviet Union vill undoubtedly attempt to attach hostile sectivation to this development in order to cover our can insullity to win this race. To er Seviet accusations, the satellite should be launched in an atmosphere of international good will and corner accentific interest. For this reason the Cik strengly consurs in the Important of lefense's suggestion that a civilian agency such as the C.S. National Countities of the 1/H supervise its development and that an effort be made to release some of the knowledge to the international scientific community.

the small solectific remicle is also a necessary step in the development of a larger satellite that sould possibly provide early warning information through continuous electronic and chotographic surveillance of the book. A future satellite that could directly collect intelligence data would be of great interest to the intelligence community.

The Department of self-see and consulted with the Agency, and the are made of their representations, which have our full concurrence and atrena support.

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